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SETTLING INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT CASES:
MAKING UP IS HARD TO DO
Mark C. Weber*
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (UDEA) entitles children
with disabilities to a free, appropriate public education. As part of this
entitlement, parents of a child with disabilities have the right to
challenge the services provided by their child's school in administrative
proceedings and in court. Like most other legal disputes, most IDEA
cases settle. But settling an IDEA case entails unique issues-and
unique pitfalls-that make the task even more challenging than the
settlement of other cases. IDEA has a statutory mediation provision
with extensive requirements and a one-of-a-kind prehearing settlement
device called the "resolution session" with its own set of rules. It has
an administrative offer-of-settlement provision whose interpretation is
open to debate. Jurisdiction under IDEA for actions to enforce
settlement agreements remains uncertain, and exhaustion defenses may,
or may not, bar such actions. Parents who prevail in IDEA disputes
may be awarded attorneys'fees, but that entitlement may not apply
when the case is settled. This Article describes the law of settlement of
IDEA disputes, highlighting the areas of uncertainty. It offers modest
steps to reform the law, suggesting a clarification of federal
jurisdiction, a bypass of exhaustion in settlement enforcement actions,
and greater legislative guidance on what forms of settlement may
support fees.
INTRODUCTION
Like most other legal disputes, most cases brought under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act' (IDEA) settle.2 But even
* Vincent dePaul Professor of Law, DePaul University. Thanks to Ben Johnson and
Elizabeth Graham for their research assistance, and to participants in workshops at the University
of Southern Maine and Virginia Commonwealth University. Special thanks to Paul Secunda for
his comments on the manuscript.
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2006).
2. Steven Marchese, Putting Square Pegs into Round Holes: Mediation and the Rights of
Children with Disabilities Under the IDEA, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 333, 353 & n. 120 (2001) (citing
data from New York State). Regarding cases outside the special education context, see Michael J.
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though IDEA, the federal law governing special education, has been
around since the 1970s, litigants are still without clear guidance
about how the mechanisms of settlement should work, what the
settlement agreement ought to look like, and what to do if either side
of the dispute fails to live up to its agreement. 3
Existing legal literature largely neglects the law that governs the
settlement of IDEA cases. A number of useful articles describe the
statute's dispute resolution processes,4 and some articles contain
valuable discussions of the benefits and drawbacks of special
education case mediation,5 but the actual law controlling special
education settlement remains an under-studied field.
This should come as no surprise. For all the time and effort that
practicing lawyers devote to settling cases, the law of settlement
occupies little of the legal literature6 and less of the law school
curriculum. Students may be exposed to offers of judgment7 in Civil
Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why
Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1212-14 (1992) (collecting and analyzing studies of civil case
dispositions).
3. In the past five years, there have been four Supreme Court cases interpreting the statute,
but none concerning settlement. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484 (2009)
(permitting claim for tuition reimbursement for private schooling of child found ineligible for
services by public school); Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007) (finding
that parents may file IDEA appeals in court pro se); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006) (disallowing expert witness costs as part of attorneys' fees for
prevailing parents); Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (placing burden of proof at
administrative hearing on party challenging educational program).
4. E.g., Andrea F. Blau, Available Dispute Resolution Processes Within the Reauthorized
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEIA) of 2004: Where Do Mediation
Principles Fit In?, 7 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L.J. 65 (2007); Demetra Edwards, Note, New
Amendments to Resolving Special Education Disputes: Any Good IDEAs?, 5 PEPP. DISP. RESOL.
L.J. 137 (2005).
5. E.g., Steven S. Goldberg & Dixie Snow Huefner, Dispute Resolution in Special
Education: An Introduction to Litigation Alternatives, 99 EDUC. LAW REP. 703 (1995);
Marchese, supra note 2, at 361-65.
6. The most celebrated law review article about settlement pays attention not to the law of
settlement, but rather to the social effects of settlement as a pervasive practice and the ideology
behind support for agreed solutions. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073
(1984). Nevertheless, there are exceptions to the generalization in the text, notably the work of
Professor Parness, see, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness & Matthew R. Walker, Enforcing Settlements in
Federal Civil Actions, 36 IND. L. REV. 33 (2003); Jeffrey A. Parness & Matthew R. Walker,
Thinking Outside the Civil Case Box: Reformulating Pretrial Conference Laws, 50 U. KAN. L.
REV. 347 (2002); and that of Professor Korobkin, see, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin, The Role of Law
in Settlement, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPuTE REsOLUTION 254 (Michael L. Moffit & Robert C.
Bordone eds., 2005); Russell B. Korobkin et al., The Law of Bargaining, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 839
(2004).
7. See FED. R. CIv. P. 68 (establishing offer-of-judgment procedure).
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Procedure, learn about consent decrees' in Remedies, and absorb
some lessons about the limits of conduct connected with settlement
in Professional Responsibility.9 But the portion of the law school
curriculum that deals most directly with settlement focuses on skills:
courses such as Mediation or Negotiation Strategy are designed more
to initiate students in the techniques of reaching mutually
advantageous agreements than to train them in the legal framework
that governs the formation and enforcement of a settlement in a civil
case. "0 It is a commonplace that settlements are contracts and are
construed accordingly. " But they are highly specialized contracts,
ones that the law treats in a particularized fashion that students learn
little about in law school.
8. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not treat consent decrees differently from other
injunctions. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65 (covering injunctions). Rule 23(e) covers settlements in class
actions, a topic that students may study in a second-semester Civil Procedure or Complex
Litigation course. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (covering settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise
of class actions). Rule 41(a)(1) covers stipulation for voluntary dismissal, a typical mechanism
for disposition of settled cases, particularly cases for damages. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1).
9. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2007) (requiring lawyer to
defer to client's decision whether to settle); R. 1.8(g) (generally prohibiting aggregate
settlements); R. 1.8(h) (generally forbidding settlement of claim between lawyer and client in
absence of independent representation for client); R. 5.6(b) (generally prohibiting settlements that
restrict lawyer's right to practice); see also Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 738, 744 (1986)
(finding no barrier in professional ethics rules or federal law to defendants' conditioning of
settlement on plaintiffs' waiver of civil rights attorneys' fees). There are a few other instances of
coverage of settlement in law school classes, but what is striking is how scarce and disjointed the
coverage is. Among the examples are the exclusion of evidence of compromise and offers to
compromise, a topic that receives perhaps half a class hour of coverage in Evidence, see generally
FED. R. EVID. 408 (barring compromises and offers to compromise); legal malpractice for settling
too cheaply, which takes up a few minutes in Torts, see generally Grayson v. Wofsey, Rosen,
Kweskin & Kuriansky, 646 A.2d 195 (Conn. 1994) (upholding action against attorney for
inducing client to settle); and attorneys' fees for settlements and validity of release-dismissal
agreements, which might receive a little class time in Civil Rights or Federal Courts, see
generally Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532
U.S. 598 (2001) (forbidding fees award when suit induced legislative change that mooted case);
Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987) (upholding release-dismissal agreement).
Federal jurisdiction to enforce settlements may receive a mention in Civil Procedure or Federal
Courts. See generally Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994) (finding
no enforcement jurisdiction unless reserved).
10. See, e.g., Katheryn M. Dutenhaver, Dispute Resolution and Its Purpose in the
Curriculum of DePaul University College of Law, 50 FLA. L. REv. 719 (1998) (describing
Dispute Resolution curricula). See generally LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION
AND LAWYERS (4th ed. 2009) (text for law school courses on Dispute Resolution).
11. See Daniel Blegen, Oral Settlement Agreements: Just What Did I Agree To?, 55 J. Mo.
B. 95, 95 & n.2 (1999) (collecting Missouri authority); Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Settlement
Agreements and the Supreme Court, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 9 (1996). Settlement agreements as
such receive scant attention in the typical Contracts course, however.
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Settling an IDEA case entails unique issues-and unique
pitfalls-that make the task even more challenging than the
settlement of other cases. IDEA has a statutory mediation provision
with extensive requirements12 and a one-of-a-kind prehearing
settlement device, termed the "resolution session," with its own
peculiar characteristics. 13 Special education settlement agreements
may be vulnerable to attack on the ground that they undermine the
statutory purpose of IDEA. Jurisdiction under IDEA for actions to
enforce settlements is uncertain, and exhaustion defenses may, or
may not, bar the action. There is an administrative offer-of-
settlement provision14 whose interpretation is open to debate, and
parents who prevail in special education disputes have an entitlement
to attorneys' fees that may, or may not, apply when a case is
settled. "5
This Article aims to provide a comprehensive description of the
current law of settlement for IDEA disputes. It delves into the
mediation and dispute resolution processes, discussing what can be
mediated and what rules apply. It notes the courts' general practice
of enforcing settlement agreements as written, despite arguments that
departures from settlement terms might be justified under the statute.
It marshals the arguments and discusses the caselaw with regard to
the courts' jurisdiction to enforce settlement agreements and the
administrative exhaustion defense. It describes the offer-of-
settlement rule, makes note of its operation, and discusses its
interaction with the attorneys' fees provision. It takes up attorneys'
fees for settlements, discussing the circumstances under which
attorneys' fees might be available to parents who reach compromises
in IDEA cases. Although this Article is intended primarily to be
descriptive, it builds an evaluation from its descriptive sections and
puts forward some steps for reforming the law of IDEA case
settlement: a clarification of federal jurisdiction for special education
settlement enforcement, a bypassing of exhaustion for civil actions
enforcing settlements, and greater guidance as to what forms of
settlement may support fees.
12. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2006).
13. § 1415(f)(1)(B).
14. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i).
15. § 1415(i)(3).
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Part I of this Article is a brief introduction to the legal
framework established by IDEA for education of students with
disabilities and resolution of disputes that arise under the law. In Part
II, the Article turns to the legal issues involved in settling special
education cases, discussing the dispute resolution session and
mediation. Part III covers the broad topic of settlement enforcement,
including how settlement agreements should be interpreted and
courts' jurisdiction to enforce agreements, as well as the
administrative exhaustion defense. Part IV moves from that topic to
offers of settlement and the impact of offer-of-settlement practice on
attorneys' fees awards. Part V considers the legal forms of
settlement, asking when, if ever, a settlement may take a form such
that attorneys' fees may be awarded to prevailing parents on the
basis of the agreement. Part VI discusses proposals for reforming the
law of settlement with regard to enforcement jurisdiction, the
exhaustion defense, offers of settlement, and entitlement to fees.
I. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) requires
states that accept federal special education funding to provide free,
appropriate public education to all children with disabilities within
their jurisdiction. 16 States and local school districts assume not only
the duty to provide an appropriate education to these children, but
also the obligation to furnish services related to education, such as
transportation, physical and occupational therapy, and sign language
interpretation. "7 Children with disabilities must be educated, to the
maximum extent appropriate, in inclusive settings, and
supplementary aids and services must be furnished to avoid the need
for removal of children from regular classes. 18
Under IDEA, parents of a child with disabilities have rights to
participate in the creation of the written program that sets out the
services to be delivered to their child. 19 These rights include the
ability to challenge the services or placement the school offers, as
16. See 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (i) (2006) (authorizing appropriations).
17. See id. § 1401(26) (defining "related services").
18. Id. § 1412(a)(5).
19. See id. § 1414(d) (requiring opportunity for parental participation in devising
individualized education program).
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well as other aspects of the provision or denial of education to the
child, by demanding an adversarial "due process" hearing; both the
parents and the school district may appeal the result of the hearing to
court.2" The procedural mechanisms guarantee that the law is
enforced in each individual case and that decision making by schools
is transparent. These procedures were critical features of the 1975
Education for All Handicapped Children Act, the statute that is now
IDEA; they demonstrate a "congressional emphasis" on participation
rights and procedural regularity.2" Two federal cases strongly
influenced Congress in its drafting of the law; both upheld
procedural due process claims against exclusion from public school
without notice and the opportunity for an adversarial hearing. 22
When Congress enacted amendments to the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act in 1990, it renamed the law the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. 23 The original law24 was
the result of years of effort to create a legally enforceable personal
entitlement to appropriate public schooling for all children who meet
a disability standard and need special education. 25 Although some
states and localities had been educating children with disabilities and
receiving limited federal special education funding to support their
efforts, at the time of the law's passage 1.75 million children with
20. Id. § 1415(f)-(i). The child remains in the existing placement during the pendency of
proceedings. § 14150). Attorneys' fees are available to parents if they are successful. Id.
§ 1415(i)(3)(B)-(F). The law also provides rights to challenge long-term suspensions, expulsions,
or other removals from school imposed on children with disabilities. § 1415(k).
21. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982); see also id. at 205 ("Congress
placed . . . emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large
measure of participation at every stage of the administrative process .... ").
22. Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pa. Ass'n for Retarded Children
v. Pennsylvania (P.A.R.C.), 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972), 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
The Supreme Court commented on the importance of these cases to the formation of the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act in Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192-93.
23. Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990). The term "handicapped" had become
disfavored, and many in the disabilities rights movement favored placing the noun "person" or
"individual" first and the "with disabilities" modifier later, in order to emphasize that a person
with a disability is a human being rather than a manifestation of an impairment. See ILL.
ATrORNEY GEN., DISABILITY RIGHTS: MANUAL OF STYLE FOR DEPICTING PEOPLE WITH
DISABILITIES, http://www.ag.state.il.us/rights/manual.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
24. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
25. Id.
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disabilities were excluded from public school and 2.5 million were in
inadequate programs.26
President George W. Bush signed the latest amendments to
IDEA, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act
(the "Improvement Act"), on December 3, 2004.27 The Improvement
Act left the fundamentals of IDEA intact, but added requirements
regarding highly qualified teachers, student assessment, and the other
features of the No Child Left Behind initiative. 28 It also permitted
some federal special education funding to be used for intervention
services for children not yet determined to have a qualifying
disability. 29 It changed eligibility determination rules for children
with learning disabilities. 30 Most significantly for present purposes, it
refined and expanded provisions introduced in 1997 to promote
alternative dispute resolution, and thus produced the mediation and
resolution session provisions described in the next section of this
Article.
II. IDEA's MEDIATION AND
RESOLUTION SESSION REQUIREMENTS
Under the present terms of IDEA, mediation must be made
available for all matters, including those that occur before the filing
of a due process hearing request. 3 Basic rules with regard to
26. H.R. REP. No. 94-332, at 11-12 (1975). The special education law came into place
against a background of broader federal efforts to end discrimination against persons with
disabilities. In 1973, Congress passed section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which forbids
discrimination against persons with disabilities by recipients of federal funding. 29 U.S.C. § 794
(2006). Since state educational agencies and local school districts receive federal money, section
504 confers the right to nondiscrimination in education on children who have disabilities. The
coverage of section 504 is broader than that of IDEA, and accordingly the nondiscrimination law
protects some children who do not meet the definition of eligible children found in IDEA, as well
as those who do. For a discussion of numerous difficult eligibility issues under IDEA, see Mark
C. Weber, The IDEA Eligibility Mess, 57 BUFF L. REV. 83 (2009). In 1990, Congress passed title
II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which bars discrimination against persons with
disabilities by units of state and local government (again including state educational agencies and
local school districts), creating yet another remedy for disability discrimination in education. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12150.
27. Acts Approved by the President, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 2936 (Dec. 13, 2004).
See generally Mark C. Weber, Reflections on the New Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act, 58 FLA. L. REV. 7 (2006) (describing and evaluating 2004 amendments).
28. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(10)(B) (defining highly qualified teachers), 1412(a)(16)
(governing participation in assessments by children with disabilities) (2006).
29. Id. § 1413(f).
30. Id. § 1414(b)(6)(A).
31. Id. § 1415(e)(1).
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mediation include the following: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must
not be used to delay or deny a parent's right to a hearing or any other
rights; (3) it must be conducted by a qualified, trained, and impartial
mediator; (4) the state has to bear the cost; (5) scheduling must be
timely and convenient to the parties; (6) a written agreement that is
reached at mediation must be signed by both the parent and a
representative of the school district who has binding authority, and it
is enforceable in court; and (7) mediation discussions, even if an
agreement is not reached, are confidential and may not be used as
evidence in a due process proceeding or civil litigation. 32 Parents
involved in mediation must also be afforded an opportunity to meet
with a disinterested party affiliated either with a parent training and
information or community parent resource center, or with an
appropriate dispute resolution entity. 33 The state has to maintain a list
of qualified mediators. 14
Seven years ago, special education mediation was the subject of
a General Accounting Office study. 3' The study found that state
officials have an extremely positive view of the special education
mediation process.3 6 Various other reports on mediation are also
highly favorable. A major advantage to mediation over litigation is
that when the parties to a dispute are together with a skilled
mediator, they might think of solutions to the dispute that meet their
respective interests but may be something other than what a hearing
officer might order.38 Criticism of the current system of special
32. § 1415(e)(2). See generally Ellen E. Deason, Enforcing Mediated Settlement
Agreements: Contract Law Collides with Confidentiality, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 33 (2001)
(suggesting balanced approach to disclosure of mediation communications).
33. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(B) (2006).
34. § 1415(e)(2)(C).
35. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SPECIAL EDUCATION: NUMBERS OF FORMAL
DISPUTES ARE GENERALLY LOW AND STATES ARE USING MEDIATION AND OTHER STRATEGIES
TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS (2003).
36. Id. at 18. The opinion may be related to the procedure's cost savings. The report noted
that in one state, the cost of using a mediator was about one-tenth that of using a hearing officer.
Id. at 3. Another state had a figure of one-ninth. See id.
37. E.g., Damon Huss, Comment, Balancing Acts: Dispute Resolution in US. and English
Special Education Law, 25 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COM. L. REV. 347, 359 (2003) ("The mediation
provision's design . ..nurtures and protects positive relationships between parents and the
educational authorities.").
38. See Paul M. Secunda, Mediating the Special Education Front Lines in Mississippi, 76
UMKC L. REV. 823, 825-28 (2008) (discussing successful resolution of special education dispute
for teen in adult prison); see also Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?:
"The Problem" in Court-Oriented Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 863, 869 (2008)
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education mediation centers on power disparities between the school
district and the parents, particularly when the parents cannot afford a
lawyer. " Some evaluations are mixed or essentially neutral. 40
The resolution session is to be used in due process cases in
which mediation is not, unless the parents and the school district
agree in writing to waive the session and go directly to hearing. 4
This session must be convened within fifteen days of the parent's
demand for due process, and has to include the parent and relevant
members of the Individualized Education Program (IEP) team,
including someone with decision-making authority from the school
district.4" The parents are to discuss their complaint and the facts
behind it, and the school district is given the opportunity to resolve
the case.43. Unless the parent is accompanied by an attorney, the
attorney for the school district is barred from attending.44 If
agreement is reached, the parties execute a legally binding document,
which may be enforced in court;45 a party may, however, void the
settlement agreement within three business days of when the
agreement is signed. 46 If the parties do not resolve the dispute within
thirty days of the receipt of the due process complaint, the applicable
timelines for hearings and appeals begin to run again.
(describing position that mediation permits "the parties to work together [so as to] ... allow a
focus on the parties' real needs and interests, in addition to their legal claims; offer a flexible
process customized to fit the parties' situation, emotions, and interests; and encourage the
development of a range of creative and responsive outcomes").
39. Huss, supra note 37, at 361-62; see Marchese, supra note 2, at 361-65.
40. Compare Grace E. D'Alo, Accountability in Special Education Mediation: Many a Slip
'Twixt Vision and Practice?, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 240-42 (2003) (reporting on basis of
study of perceptions among participants in special mediations in Pennsylvania that mediators
were more successful in averting due process hearings than in building relationships between
parents and schools or accomplishing other goals), with Peter J. Kuriloff& Steven S. Goldberg, Is
Mediation a Fair Way to Resolve Special Education Disputes? First Empirical Findings, 2
HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 35, 60-61 (1997) (reporting on basis of study of perceptions of fairness
among participants in special education mediations in New Jersey, that "[p]articipants in this
study generally expressed only mild satisfaction with mediation and perceived it only as a
modestly fair procedure," and further noting concerns about power imbalance when parents
lacked attorney representation).
41. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i)(1V) (2006).
42. § 1415(f)(l)(B3)(i)(I)-(II).
43. § 1415(f)(l)(B3)(i)(IV.
44. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i)(III).
45. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii).
46. § 1415(f(l)(B)(iv).
47. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii).
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Relatively little precedent exists on the specifics of the
mediation and resolution procedures, but one prominent decision,
D.D. v. District of Columbia,48 fills out the permissible content of the
resolution session by stating that attorneys' fees may be discussed at
the session if the parents or counsel believe in good faith that they
have an entitlement to fees for work done prior to the session. 4 The
magistrate judge report that this opinion adopts, Davis v. District of
Columbia,5" held that the due process hearing officer erred by
dismissing the complaint on the ground that the defendants offered a
settlement in full satisfaction of the parent's complaint when the
parent did not believe the complaint had been resolved to her
satisfaction. " The magistrate judge opinion also held that the
defendants undermined the parent's right to counsel by refusing at
the resolution session to negotiate about the parent's attorneys'
fees.52 Another case, Friendship Edison Public Charter School
Chamberlain Campus v. Smith,53 ruled that a hearing officer erred in
excluding testimonial and documentary evidence regarding a
resolution session, finding that when the evidence was proffered to
show that a parent was responsible for the delay in completion of
evaluations, Federal Rule of Evidence 408 was inapplicable and no
other provision required confidentiality.5 4 Davis made a similar
determination regarding admissibility of evidence about the
resolution session. 55
The 2002 Report of the President's Commission on Excellence
in Special Education would have gone even further in promoting
alternative dispute resolution than establishing mediation and
resolution session procedures. The report proposed voluntary binding
48. 470 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007).
49. Id. at 2.
50. No. 05-2176 PLF/DAR, 2006 WL 3917779 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2006).
51. Id. at *7-*8.
52. Id. at *8-*9.
53. 561 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D.D.C. 2008).
54. Id. at 80-83. Rule 408 bars the admissibility of evidence of offers of compromise of the
claim as well as (except in some criminal cases) conduct or statements made in compromise
negotiations when offered to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a claim, or to impeach
through a prior inconsistent statement.
55. Davis, 2006 WL 3917779, at *6-*7.
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arbitration before arbitrators specially trained in conflict resolution. 5 6
It is unclear that presenting a case before an arbitrator would be any
cheaper or quicker than presenting one before a due process hearing
officer. An arbitration process would presumably cut off appeals, but
as a matter of public policy that may not offer any advantage over a
hearing in which the parties retain appellate rights. 57 In any case, the
comprehensive 2004 reauthorization of IDEA, the Improvement Act,
did not adopt the Commission's proposal, although the House draft
of the reauthorization bill included such a provision and the House
Committee's Report commented favorably on it.5" The Senate's
version of the reauthorization bill did not include arbitration, and the
House conferees agreed to recede. "
III. INTERPRETING AND ENFORCING SETTLEMENTS
Interpretation and enforcement of settlement agreements can
present challenging issues. Interpretation encompasses construction
of the agreement itself, public policy considerations with regard to
specific terms, and special issues concerning settlement of minors'
claims. Enforcement embraces issues of jurisdiction and exhaustion
of administrative remedies.
A. Interpretation of Settlements
In general, settlement agreements will be enforced precisely as
written. An illustrative case is Stephen H. v. West Contra Costa
County Unified School District Financing Corp.,60 in which parents
alleged that their child was struck by at least four different teacher
aides over a five-month period and otherwise physically and
emotionally abused because of outward manifestations of his
56. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN SPECIAL EDUC., A NEW ERA: REVITALIZING
SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 40-41 (2002), available at
http://www.ed.gov/inits/commissionboards/whspecialeducation/reports/images/pres-rep.pdf.
57. See Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Aligning or Maligning? Getting Inside a New IDEA,
Getting Behind No Child Left Behind and Getting Outside of It All, 15 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J.
1, 16 (2004) ("Binding arbitration is not really an appealing endeavor, and may well lead to a
lose-lose situation between home and school."). But see Perry A. Zirkel, The Over-Legalization of
Special Education, 195 EDUC. L. REP. 35, 38 (2005) (advocating "the arbitration model of a
single-session hearing without judicial appeal with very limited exceptions, the principal one
being in cases that present major new legal issues").
58. H.R. REP. No. 108-77, at 113-14 (2003).
59. H.R. REP. No. 108-779, at 216 (2004) (Conf. Rep.).
60. No. C 06-06655 TEH, 2007 WL 1557482 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2007).
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learning disability. 6' The court denied a motion to dismiss claims
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,62 the Americans with
Disabilities Act,63 IDEA, and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, when the defendant's
motion relied on a settlement agreement previously entered into by
the parties. 6 The agreement released the defendant from liability for
all educational claims, but it created an exception for potential claims
arising out of interactions with aides.65
As Stephen H. suggests, settlement agreements in special
education disputes are enforced under general principles of contract
law. This in turn implies that enforcement may be challenged on the
grounds of public policy and unconscionability. Most courts,
however, have been unsympathetic to parents' claims that the
settlements to which they agreed gave away too much, or that the
parents were taken advantage of in the bargaining process.
D.R. v. East Brunswick Board of Education66 is a prominent
case in which the court refused to invalidate a settlement agreement
despite an argument that the basic protections that IDEA furnishes to
a child had been bargained away. 67 In D.R., the parents of a child
with severe developmental disabilities placed him at a private
residential school because of dissatisfaction with his progress in a
program offered by the school district. 68 While their dispute over
school district funding for the private school was pending, the
parents and the district entered into an agreement in which the
district agreed to pay the costs of the private school at a rate of
$27,500 per year for one school year and that amount plus ninety
percent of any increase the next year. 69 The parents agreed that the
district would be absolved of any other costs for the placement,
related services, or transportation incurred due to the school
transfer. 70 The next year, the tuition increased dramatically, and the
61. Id. at *1.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006).
64. Stephen H., 2007 WL 1557482, at *2.
65. Id.
66. 109 F.3d 896 (3d Cir. 1997).
67. Id. The case is criticized in Marchese, supra note 2, at 358-61.
68. D.R., 109 F.3d at 898.
69. Id. at 899.
70. Id.
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private school added a charge for the services of two aides. ", The
school district refused to pay any portion of the cost of the aides,
contending that the aides' services were a related service that they
had not agreed to pay for under the agreement. 7 2 The district court
ruled that the aides were educationally necessary, so the school
district had to fund them; the court reasoned that the settlement was
void because the child's circumstances had changed. "
The court of appeals, however, reversed that decision, ruling that
the child's circumstances did not change, but rather the only change
was that the private school concluded that more help was needed to
deal with the child's unchanged condition. " The court refused to
void the settlement despite the dissent's argument that enforcing a
settlement in which the parents and the school district bargain away a
child's fundamental rights undermines the public policy underlying
IDEA. 75 The majority reasoned that permitting a party to void an
"unpalatable" agreement would be contrary to the broad federal
policy of encouraging settlement. 76
One court has distinguished D.R., noting that D.R. did not
consider the situation in which the child's circumstances in fact had
changed. 77 In that case, E.D. ex rel. Dukes v. Enterprise City Board
of Education, the court enforced a settlement agreement in principal
part, though it considered with regard to each breach of the
agreement whether the school district had deprived the child of free,
appropriate public education by noncompliance.78 A Connecticut
court dismissed an action for breach of contract and unjust
enrichment brought by a school district after parents violated a
settlement agreement by requesting a due process hearing before the
expiration of the time period set in the agreement. 7' The court found
the barrier to seeking due process to be void as against public
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 900.
74. Id. at900-01.
75. See id. at 902 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 901 (majority opinion).
77. E.D. ex rel. Dukes v. Enter. City Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1269 (M.D. Ala.
2003).
78. Id. at 1260-66.
79. New Fairfield Bd. of Educ. v. Cortese, No. CV030349701S, 2005 WL 647556 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Jan. 24, 2005).
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policy,80 and held there was no unjust enrichment in the parents'
keeping $19,000 in settlement proceeds because the amount
represented a valid settlement for the parents' tuition reimbursement
claims for the previous school year. 81
Considerations other than public policy may come into play
when the law requires judicial approval of a settlement, as with the
settlement of purely monetary claims involving a minor-child
plaintiff. In a proceeding to approve a minor-child settlement of a
court case involving claims under IDEA, section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and other laws, a court rejected an uncontested
motion to enter an approval and dismiss the case. 82 Applying state
law best-interests-of-the-child standards, the court ruled that the
proponents of the settlement had failed to provide adequate
information about the condition of the child, the adequacy of the
monetary settlement, and the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees
portion for the court to enter approval at that time. 83
B. Enforcement of Settlements
Questions exist about courts' jurisdiction to enforce settlements,
and whether settlements can be enforced directly in court or whether
parental claims that the school district failed to obey a settlement
must first be administratively exhausted. The Improvement Act
established that settlements reached either at mediation or at the
resolution session are enforceable in federal district court or state
court. ' The absence of any mention of an exhaustion requirement
implies that if the opposing party violates a settlement agreement
reached at either of these two sorts of meetings, direct enforcement
will be available, and exhaustion through a due process hearing will
not be necessary.
Nevertheless, some courts have required exhaustion for
enforcement of settlements reached at mediation or the resolution
session. In R.K. v. Hayward Unified School District,85 the plaintiff
sought a declaratory judgment of the parties' rights and obligations
80. Id. at *5.
81. Id. at *6.
82. Johnson v. Clearfield Area Sch. Dist., 319 F. Supp. 2d 583 (W.D. Pa. 2004).
83. Id. at 587-92.
84. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(F)(iii) (mediation), (f)(1)(B)(iii)(II) (resolution session) (2006).
85. No. C 06-07836 JSW, 2007 WL 2778702 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2007).
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under a settlement agreement reached at mediation that called for the
child to be placed at a private school. 86 The plaintiff alleged that the
school district failed to comply with the settlement by not facilitating
necessary meetings and not permitting the parents' expert to attend
meetings that did occur; by the time of the litigation, the private
school had discharged the child and the child was out of school
entirely. " The court found jurisdiction for the action to enforce the
agreement pursuant to the new IDEA provision as well as on the
basis that a claim concerning an IDEA settlement agreement arises
under federal law, but it dismissed the case on the ground that
exhaustion was required.88 Relying primarily on cases involving
settlements not reached at mediation, the court reasoned that the
presence of jurisdiction did not satisfy the exhaustion requirement
generally applicable to IDEA disputes, and further stated that the
case would benefit from development of the record at an
administrative hearing.89 In another case, Pedraza v. Alameda
Unified School District, the court ruled that it had jurisdiction over
a dispute regarding an alleged failure to provide services and
reimbursement agreed upon in a settlement reached at mediation
when the parents contended that the failure resulted in denial of an
appropriate education. 9 The court found that the exhaustion
requirement applied to settlements reached at mediation, but ruled
that in the particular case exhaustion would be excused on the
ground that it was futile. 92 The court relied on the fact that a
complaint filed with the state education department had failed to
produce enforcement.93 Courts have also dismissed actions based on
breaches of settlement agreements reached outside of mediation or
86. Id. at *1, *6. The plaintiff asserted other claims as well. See generally R.K. v. Hayward
Unified Sch. Dist., 246 F. App'x 474 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming denial of temporary order).
87. R.K., 2007 WL 2778702, at *2.
88. Id. at *6--*9.
89. Id. at *7-*8. The court disagreed with an order from the state hearing authority saying
the state authority lacked the jurisdiction to address a breach of the settlement agreement. Id. at
*8.
90. No. C 05-04977 VRW, 2007 WL 949603 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2007).
91. Id. at *2,*3,*7.
92. Id. at *5-*7.
93. Id. at *6.
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the resolution session, typically citing lack of jurisdiction or failure
to exhaust. "
Cases such as E.D. and School Board v. M.C 95 point in the
opposite direction, however. The MC. court said that the Department
of Administrative Hearings did not have jurisdiction over due
process hearings for enforcement of settlement agreements and
suggested that jurisdiction existed in the state's circuit court.96 In
E.D., the federal court directly enforced key provisions of a
settlement agreement, though it considered with regard to each
breach of the agreement whether the school district had deprived the
child of free, appropriate public education by noncompliance. " An
additional court ruled that a settlement agreement embodied in an
individualized educational program (IEP) may be enforced directly
in court without exhaustion, relying on legislative history and
precedent establishing that failures to provide services listed in an
IEP are matters that can be brought directly to the judiciary. 98 Still
another court applied 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a remedy for violation of
IDEA and entered a $10,000 damages judgment when a school
district failed to provide compensatory education in accordance with
agreements that it made in settling a due process proceeding. 99
IV. IDEA's OFFER-OF-SETTLEMENT RULE
Under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i), if parents reject a written
offer of settlement that is as favorable as or more favorable than what
they obtain at hearing, fees accrued after the offer was received may
not be awarded to them, though there is an exception if the parents
94. E.g., J.M.C. v. La. Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 584 F. Supp. 2d 894 (M.D.
La. 2008); Traverse Bay Area Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Mich. Dep't of Educ., No. 5:06-CV-139,
2007 WL 2219352 (W.D. Mich. July 27, 2007); M.J. v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., No. 1:05-CV-
00927 OWW LJO, 2007 WL 1033444 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2007).
95. 796 So. 2d 581 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
96. Id. at 582-83. But see H.C. v. Colton-Pierrepont Cent. Sch. Dist., 567 F. Supp. 2d 340,
344 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (ruling that it was error for hearing officer and state administrative review
officer to refuse to consider claim that school district breached settlement agreement, reasoning
that hearing officer had duty to enforce settlement), vacated, 341 F. App'x 687 (2d Cir. 2009)
(holding that hearing officer lacked authority to enforce settlement agreement in case; leaving
open on remand question whether district court had jurisdiction to enforce agreement).
97. E.D. ex reL Dukes v. Enter. City Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1260-66 (M.D.
Ala. 2003).
98. McClendon v. Sch. Dist., No. 04-1250, 2004 WL 2440661 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2004).
99. Reid v. Sch. Dist., No. Civ. A. 03-1742, 2004 WL 1926324 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2004).
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prevail and were substantially justified in rejecting the settlement
offer. "' This provision is an administrative version of the rule that
applies to civil disputes in the federal courts, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 68, and is similarly designed to promote settlement. "0 The
offer must be made more than ten days before the due process
hearing begins and may be accepted within ten days. 102
Students of economics question the effectiveness of rules like
Rule 68, which provide only one side of the dispute (the claimant) an
incentive to settle. 13 They submit that the rules bias offers
downward but leave the probabilities of settlement unchanged. "o4
Professor Geoffrey P. Miller posits that parties to disputes base their
settlement postures on what they perceive as the likely outcome of
continuing to litigate the hearing or court case. 105 For the person
bringing the case, the settlement demand is the expected recovery,
discounted by the probability of losing and getting nothing at all,
minus unrecovered litigation costs. 106 For the respondent, the offer is
the claimant's expected recovery, discounted by the probability of
the claimant losing the case, plus litigation costs that the respondent
must pay. "' A provision such as Rule 68 or the offer-of-settlement
provision in IDEA, which reduces the recovery that the parents are
likely to receive (if the offer is rejected, the fees recovery goes
down), creates an incentive for the parents to decrease the amount of
monetary and other relief they demand. 1o But school districts
perceive the same likelihood of reduction in the expected recovery
by the parents, and can be expected to decrease their offers
commensurately. ' The parties' settlement figures are thus likely to
100. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(E) (2006).
101. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i)(I).
102. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i)(I)-(II).
103. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 541 (4th ed. 1992); David
A. Anderson, Improving Settlement Devices: Rule 68 and Beyond, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 225-
26 (1994); Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 94
(1986).
104. POSNER, supra note 103, at 541; Anderson, supra note 103, at 225-26; Miller, supra
note 103, at 94.
105. Miller, supra note 103, at 94-95.
106. Id. at 96-100.
107. Id. at98-100.
108. See id. at 103.
109. See id. at 104, 110-12. Miller, of course, is discussing general civil litigation, not special
education litigation.
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stay as far apart from each other as they would be if no such rule
existed; the demand and offer will simply be at a lower amount than
if there were no rule. As Miller points out, the problem could be
solved by creating an incentive for both claimant and respondent to
settle, as by imposing extra fees on the respondent if the claimant's
demand is rejected and the claimant recovers more than the
demand. "'o No proposal of this type has emerged since creation of
the offer-of-settlement rule, however, and none was ever on the table
during the recent reauthorization of IDEA.
Courts have generally been sensitive to the fact that parents may
view some offers from school districts as less favorable than the
relief finally obtained, even though the offer may look more
attractive from other perspectives. "' A recent case along these lines
is Benito M. v. Board of Education, 112 which held that the outcome
of the due process hearing was more favorable than the offer of
judgment when the settlement offer included a day school placement
with transportation for two years, an assistive technology evaluation
with a subsequent TEP meeting to consider the evaluation results, and
a future IEP meeting to implement a change in placement. 113 In
contrast, the hearing officer ordered that the child remain at the
specific school where the parent had placed the child and that the
school district pay the tuition for the rest of that school year, that the
district schedule an IEP meeting to determine the child's placement
for the following school year, and that the district provide weekly
thirty-minute compensatory speech-language services for the
following school year. 114 A similar decision, B.R. v. Lake Placid
Central School District, "5 awarded a parent $18,874 in attorneys'
fees upon finding the consent decree that resolved the case more
favorable than the defendant's offer of settlement in that the decree
gave the parent more input on the selection of an expert evaluator
and greater specificity with regard to the length of the school day, the
110. Id. at 123-25.
111. See, e.g., Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 897 (9th Cir. 1995)
(finding result of proceedings more favorable than district's offer because child was not forced to
change schools).
112. 544 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. I11. 2008).
113. Id. at 719-20.
114. Id. at 717-18.
115. No. 07-CV-1195, 2009 WL 667453 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2009).
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exact number of compensatory education sessions, the methods of
interaction with peers, and the permissible use of physical
restraint. 116
The rules concerning mediation may interact in unpredictable
ways with the rules regarding offers of settlement. In J.D. v.
Kanawha County Board of Education, 117 the court refused to
consider whether the written offer of settlement could provide the
basis for limiting the parents' attorneys' fees, reasoning that the offer
"referred to mediation discussions by offering to settle 'on the terms
and conditions set forth in the settlement agreement reached but not
signed at the mediation session."' "' Since mediation discussions are
confidential, the school district could not introduce an agreement
reached but not signed at mediation, and thus the district had no way
to sustain its claim that the litigated outcome was no more favorable
than the offer. 119
Inclusion or exclusion of attorneys' fees may be an issue in
determining whether a litigated result is more favorable. In Hawkins
v. Berkeley Unified School District, 120 the court declared a parent
substantially justified in rejecting a settlement offer including only
$500 in fees when the parent's attorneys had already incurred $9,000
in fees. 121 By contrast, in Olivas v. Cincinnati Public Schools, 122 the
court ruled that a settlement that was exactly what the hearing officer
eventually ordered with respect to services for the child but included
only $1,000 in attorneys' fees barred recovery of fees incurred after
the offer. 123
Finally, it must be noted that although the statutory rule is an
analogue to Rule 68, the analogy is less than perfect, and the
differences may create a problem. A Rule 68 offer is an offer of
judgment. 124 A judgment is a judicial action, enforceable by ordinary
processes of execution, ultimately backed by the contempt
116. Id. at *2-*3, *5.
117. 571 F.3d 381 (4thCir. 2009).
118. Id. at 385.
119. Id.
120. No. C-07-4206 EMC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94673 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20,2008).
121. Id. at *61.
122. 872 N.E.2d 962 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).
123. Id. at 967-68.
124. FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
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sanction. '25 A settlement under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i) does not
have the character of a judgment, and, as noted, there are serious
issues about settlements' enforceability. 126 For this reason, it is
doubtful whether a settlement is ever as good as or better than a due
process hearing decision affording relief to the claimants. Although
even a decision in a fully litigated due process case is not a judicial
judgment of the type Rule 68 contemplates, it is a final order, and
under the leading case, Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 127 it may be
enforced in court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without further
administrative exhaustion. 128 It is thus a far more valuable item than
any private settlement.
V. FORM OF SETTLEMENT AND ITS
IMPACT ON ATTORNEYS' FEES REQUESTS
In Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources, 29 the Supreme Court
held that under the attorneys' fees provisions relevant to that case,
settlements do not entitle parties to fees unless the settlements have a
"judicial imprimatur," something that is true for judicial consent
decrees but not for ordinary private settlements of lawsuits. 130 The
previous approach, termed the "catalyst theory," permitted an award
of fees when the filing of the case was a catalyst for voluntary
change on the part of the defendant. 131 Courts have all but
universally applied Buckhannon's abolition of the catalyst rule to the
provision of IDEA governing the award of attorneys' fees to
prevailing parents. 132
Questions, however, remain about how to apply the Buckhannon
rule to special education disputes. Hearing officers do not ordinarily
125. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 1153 (9th ed. 2005).
126. See supra Section III.B (regarding enforceability issues).
127. 810 F.2d 1270 (4thCir. 1987).
128. Id. at 1272-75.
129. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
130. Id. at 602-05.
131. Mark C. Weber, Litigation Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act After
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human
Resources, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 357, 363-64 (2004) (discussing catalyst theory and criticizing
Buckhannon).
132. E.g., Bingham v. New Berlin Sch. Dist., 550 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2008) (reaffirming
applicability of Buckhannon to IDEA cases).
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enter orders termed "consent decrees" in special education cases. 133
The issue thus becomes what forms of hearing officer action will be
considered sufficiently analogous to the entry of a consent decree to
qualify a prevailing parent for fees, when the settlement itself does
not include a fees award. Several courts have determined that fees
may be awarded on the basis of the entry of an agreed order at a due
process hearing, 134 or when an agreement was read into the record in
front of a hearing officer. 135 The leading case is A.R. ex rel. R. V. v.
New York City Department of Education, 136 which affirmed an award
of fees when hearing officers placed the words "so ordered" on
settlement agreements. 137 In V.M. v. Brookland School District, 138 the
court awarded fees on the basis of a negotiated settlement agreement
presented to the hearing officer as a consent order and incorporated
into the hearing officer's decision. "' By contrast, ordinary private
settlements have been held not to support applications for fee awards
because of Buckhannon. 140
A related issue is whether the parent can use the right of appeal
to challenge a hearing officer's refusal to memorialize a settlement in
a form having the hearing officer's imprimatur. In Traverse Bay
Area Intermediate School District v. Michigan Department of
Education, 141 the parties reached a settlement agreement pursuant to
an offer of judgment, and the parent's counsel indicated an intention
to file a motion asking the hearing officer to review the settlement
and incorporate it into an order of dismissal. 142 However, the hearing
133. See infra notes 142-147 and accompanying text.
134. E.g., Brandon K. v. New Lenox Sch. Dist., No. 01 C 4625, 2001 WL 1491499, at *2
(N.D. Il1. Nov. 23, 2001).
135. E.g., Jose Luis R. v. Joliet Twp. High Sch. Dist., No. 01 C 4798, 2001 WL 1000734, at
*2 (N.D. 11. Aug. 29, 2001). Contra Jose Luis R. v. Joliet Twp. High Sch. Dist., No. 01 C 4798,
2002 WL 54544, at *3-*4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2002) (ultimately rejecting award of fees on that
basis).
136. 407 F.3d 65, 65 (2d Cir. 2005).
137. Id. at 65; see also V.G. v. Auburn Enlarged Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 5:06-CV-531
(NAM/GHL), 2008 WL 5191703, at *4-*5 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2008) (awarding fees on basis of
consent decree ordered by hearing officer, refusing to inquire as to thoroughness of hearing
officer review), aff'd, 349 F .App'x 582 (2d Cir. 2009).
138. No. 3:05CV00232 JMM, 2008 WL 2001733 (E.D. Ark. May 6, 2008).
139. Id. at *4.
140. See Bingham v. New Berlin Sch. Dist., 550 F.3d 601, 603 (7th Cir. 2008) (collecting
cases).
141. No. 5:06-CV-139, 2008 WL 351651 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 6,2008).
142. Id. at *2.
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officer refused. 113 The court held that under those circumstances the
state review officer lacked authority to enter the agreement as a
consent order incorporating the terms of settlement over the
objection of the school district. '44The court nevertheless awarded the
parent fees on the basis of the district's unsuccessful effort to enforce
settlement agreement provisions against the parent. 145 Similarly, in
Wright v. District of Columbia, 146 the court denied fees when,
although the parties agreed during the hearing that the district would
conduct a psychosocial evaluation for the child and convene a multi-
disciplinary team and student evaluation plan meeting, the hearing
officer issued an order stating that the matter was settled without a
prevailing party. 14
Nevertheless, a case is not made moot when the defendant offers
full relief on the merits in a private settlement that does not carry a
judicial imprimatur and so lacks the enforceability of a settlement
that has judicial approval. 148 Judicial imprimatur may come in the
form of a retention of jurisdiction after settlement, even a retention of
jurisdiction over the fees issue. Applying Ninth Circuit authority, a
court has ruled that retention of jurisdiction to resolve the issue of
attorneys' fees is itself sufficient judicial imprimatur to support the
entry of a fees award. 141
VI. EVALUATION: IMPROVING THE
LAW OF SPECIAL EDUCATION SETTLEMENT
At this point, there seems little justification for further tinkering
with the mechanics of the IDEA mediation and resolution session.
143. Id.
144. Id. at *7.
145. Traverse Bay Area Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Mich. Dep't of Educ., No. 5:06-CV-139,
2008 WL 2397631, at *3-*4 (W.D. Mich. June 11, 2008).
146. No. 05-0990 (RWR), 2007 WL 1141582 (D.D.C. Apr. 17, 2007).
147. Id. at*1.
148. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Richard R., 567 F. Supp. 2d 918, 932 (W.D. Tex. 2008). In a
later ruling, the Fifth Circuit vacated an attorneys' fees award to the parent for work after the
offer of settlement on the ground that the litigated result was no more favorable than the
settlement offer, the parent was not justified in rejecting the settlement, and the settlement would
have been fully enforceable in court under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(l)(B)(iii)(II) because it was
offered at the resolution session. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Richard R., 591 F.3d 417, 425-29
(5th Cit. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3566 (U.S. Mar. 16, 2010) (No. 09-1127).
The settlement offer included reasonable fees to date. Id. at 419.
149. Hawkins v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-07-4206 EMC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
94673, *19-*20 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2008).
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Similarly, although one can quarrel with the results in any given
case, it seems sensible as a general matter to enforce settlement
agreements as written but leave the door slightly ajar for defenses to
enforcement based on public policy, unconscionability, or
unforeseeable changes of circumstances.
The jurisdiction and exhaustion problems with enforcing
settlement agreements are a different matter. Whether there is federal
jurisdiction to enforce a private settlement-essentially a contract-
that resolves a claim under a federal statute and ought to be
interpreted consistently with the purposes of the federal law raises
the classic question of what constitutes federal question jurisdiction
when the federal statute does not create the cause of action asserted
in the case. 150 Establishing federal jurisdiction for actions to enforce
special education settlements would certainly encourage parties to
settle by guaranteeing that a tribunal with expertise in the federal
special education law will stand ready to make the settlement stick if
that is what the law requires. But unless one finds an implied cause
of action under the statute or can rely on a cause of action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of IDEA, 151 the present legal basis for
150. Compare American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916)
(finding no jurisdiction in absence of federal cause of action), with Smith v. Kan. City Title &
Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921) (finding federal jurisdiction over state law cause of action
incorporating element turning on federal law). Leading cases from the present era are Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) (finding no jurisdiction in product
liability action turning on alleged violation of Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) and Grable
& Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering and Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308 (2005)
(finding federal jurisdiction over state law cause of action to quiet title when title hinged on
federal law regarding notice of seizure of land by federal agency). See generally RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
795-800 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing scope of federal question jurisdiction after Merrell Dow and
Grable & Sons and collecting secondary authorities). A federal court does not have jurisdiction to
enforce a settlement agreement in one of its own cases in the absence of an independent basis for
federal jurisdiction, unless the court has made compliance with the agreement or retention of
jurisdiction part of its order disposing of the case. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S.
375, 381-82 (1994).
151. Courts have mixed views on the availability of a cause of action under § 1983 for
violations of IDEA when the explicit cause of action under 20 U.S.C. § 1415 is inapplicable.
Compare J.S. v. Isle of Wight County Sch. Bd., 402 F.3d 468 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding § 1983 not
available) with Marie 0. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1997) (permitting § 1983 cause of
action). See generally MARK C. WEBER, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND LITIGATION TREATISE
§ 21.6(l)-(2), at 21:7-21:9 (2d ed. 2002) (collecting and analyzing cases). Most cases that reject
the § 1983 cause of action are damages actions, and some of the same circuits that do not allow
damages actions allow § 1983 actions for injunctive relief, at least in limited circumstances. See,
e.g., Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1987).
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jurisdiction is shallow. 152 An amendment to IDEA to create the
jurisdiction would appear to be in order, just as Congress established
jurisdiction for actions to enforce settlements reached at mediation or
the resolution session. 153
If jurisdiction exists for settlement enforcement claims, as it
undeniably does for settlements reached at mediation and the
resolution session, there is no justification to impose an exhaustion
requirement. An exhaustion requirement puts the aggrieved party
literally back at square one, having to litigate the case that was
supposed to have been resolved; that remains true even if the hearing
officer is willing to transform the claim into one over the breach of
the agreement itself, something that not all hearing officers are
willing to do nor all courts willing to require. "' Actions to enforce
special education settlement agreements need not be burdensome to
the courts. By and large, they will hinge on the straightforward
question whether the parties have or have not complied with the
letter of the agreement. Far more costly in terms of judicial and
administrative economy is the uncertainty surrounding the
enforceability of settlements.
It is difficult to be enthusiastic about the operation of the offer-
of-settlement rule. There is no reason to believe that it actually
promotes settlement, and special education cases-complex disputes
that typically involve ongoing placements and services,
compensatory programs, evaluations, behavior programs, and many
other things in addition to cash awards-seem poorly suited to
evaluations of whether an offer is or is not superior to a litigated
result. The outcomes in the cases appear to manifest a judicial
152. See Grable & Sons, 545 U.S. at 318-20 (stressing rarity of applicability of federal
jurisdiction to cases without federal causes of action).
153. One might argue that an inference can be drawn from the addition of the jurisdictional
provisions for mediation and dispute resolution that there is no jurisdiction for enforcement of
other settlements. There is nothing in the legislative history of the 2004 amendments supporting
this argument, however, and IDEA is anything but the sort of tightly constructed statute for which
it may be possible to draw negative inferences about one remedy from the explicit provision of
another. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2496 (2009) (finding existence of
tuition reimbursement remedy under general provisions of IDEA despite specific provision of
remedy under conditions inapplicable to facts of case in other part of statute).
154. See E.D. el rel. Dukes v. Enter. City Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (M.D. Ala.
2003) (enforcing settlement but requiring showing of denial of appropriate education for each
alleged breach).
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reluctance to second-guess claimants who reject settlements. 55
Adoption of a two-way offer-of-settlement rule seems unlikely. In
the absence of a movement to repeal the offer-of-settlement
provision, perhaps the best that can be hoped for is the continued
interpretation of the rule in the way that most courts have done. On
the specific issue of inclusion or noninclusion of fees in offers of
settlement, it is harsh and nonsensical to view a settlement offer as
equally favorable to claimants when it contains no fees or an
unrealistically low amount of fees and the litigated outcome contains
the same relief but will support a full fees award if such a claim is
asserted in a subsequent civil action. Holdings that run in the
opposite direction should be rejected. "'
Congressional action may be necessary to clear up the
ambiguities created by the application of Buckhannon to special
education cases. Expressly permitting hearing officers to enter
consent decrees would be one possibility. If jurisdiction to enforce
settlements is not provided to courts, it would help if Congress at
least clarified when a hearing officer may or must retain jurisdiction
to enforce an agreed disposition. Clarity on that issue would in turn
promote clarity on the fees issue by dividing settlements into those
that are like consent decrees (when jurisdiction to enforce is retained)
and those that are not (when no jurisdiction to enforce exists).
VII. CONCLUSION
The description of the law of special education settlement
provided above illustrates, if nothing else, the complexity of the
issues involved. The suggestions advanced above are hardly radical
in nature, but they may make it easier for parties in special education
cases and their advocates to sleep at night, less worried whether
settlements will stick and what to do if they do not.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 111-115 (discussing cases finding offer not superior
to litigated result).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 119-121 (discussing offer-of-settlement cases with
and without fees in offer).
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